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Sarah Kenyon Lischer2
This paper examines the conditions under which refugee flows cause conflict to spread
across borders. In order to develop propositions, the paper studies a group of Bosnian
Muslim refugees who formed an army to retake their hometown.  The situation of those
refugees suggests that external political conditions, especially support from the refugee
receiving state, determined the ability of the refugees to mobilize militarily.  The presence
of non-civilian elements among the refugees and the influence of powerful refugee leaders
acted as necessary, but not sufficient, conditions that led to violence. The Bosnian Muslim
case confirms that the actions of humanitarian agencies are constrained by the level of
available resources and the attitude of the receiving state.  Within those constraints,
UNHCR and NGOs may attempt to prevent, reduce, or ignore political violence that
involves refugees.
INTRODUCTION
If asked about the activities of refugees during the war in former Yugoslavia, most
observers quickly assert that Bosnia is not the right place to study militant refugees. Other
observers counter, with an equally broad sweep, that all male refugees were militarized
due to forced conscription into one or another state army.3  By stud ing a group of
Bosnian refugees, this paper seeks to clarify the conditions under which refugee flows
cause conflict to spread across borders. In order to develop propositions, the paper
examines a group of Bosnian Muslim refugees who formed an army to retake their
hometown.  The situation of those refugees suggests that external political conditions,
especially support from the refugee receiving state, determined the ability of the refugees
to mobilize. The presence of non-civilian elements among the refugees and the influence of
powerful refugee leaders acted as necessary, but not sufficient, conditions that led to
violence.
This research also asks what role the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and other humanitarian actors can play in preventing the spread of violence.
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The Bosnian Muslim case confirms that the actions of humanitarian agencies are
constrained by the level of available resources and the attitude of the receiving state.
Within those constraints, UNHCR and NGOs may attempt to prevent, reduce, or ignore
political violence that involves refugees.
Refugee involvement in political violence, where it occurs, presents a serious threat to
regional stability. In his address to the nation on the eve of the NATO bombing campaign
in Kosovo, President Clinton warned that the movement of thousands, if not millions, of
refugees from Kosovo would exacerbate the threat of regional violence in the Balkans.4
The mass exodus of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo in the spring of 1999 justifiably raised
fears of a wider war. One UNHCR official expressed concern that the Serbs would target
the refugee camps because “the refugee population and the KLA [Kosovo Liberation
Army] are closely linked.”5  Observers have also reported that the KLA has forcibly
conscripted refugee men into the rebel army.6  The most extreme fear is that Kosovar
refugees may cause ethnic conflict in Macedonia by upsetting the existing balance there
between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians.7
This paper focuses on how refugee flows, such as the exodus from Kosovo, can lead to
the spread of political violence across borders.  Political violence, as distinguished from
criminal violence, is defined as organized violent activity for political goals.  Although
political activity occurs in many, if not most, refugee populated areas, political violence
involving refugees occurs less often and can range from sporadic riots or beatings to full-
fledged war.  Indicators of a high level of political violence include cross border raids by
militias based in or near refugee camps, attacks on the refugee population by the sending
state, or military involvement by the refugee receiving and/or sending states.
Political violence often occurs in the context of a militarized refugee population.
Militarization describes non-civilian attributes of refugee populated areas, including
inflows of weapons, military training, and recruitment.  Militarization also includes actions
of refugees and/or exiles who engage in non-civilian activity outside the refugee camp, yet
who depend on assistance from refugees or international organizations.8 It follows that
demilitarization is the delinking of the refugee populated area from military actors and
military activity, and respect by all parties for international law relating to the protection of
refugees.9  Militarization can occur due to the presence of soldiers or militant exiles
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(including war criminals) who live in or near the refugee populated area and interact with
the refugees. Refugees or exiles who store arms and train outside the camp, yet return to
the camp for food, medical assistance, and family visits, create a militarized refugee
population. In eastern Zaire, for example, one influential Rwandan Hutu militant
purchased a house and a banana plantation in South Kivu after helping perpetrate the 1994
genocide.  From his plantation, he sheltered other militants and recruited refugees for
cross-border raids into Rwanda.  His activities endangered the refugee population and
threatened the Rwandan government.10
Despite the potential political and security risks posed by refugee situations, no theory
exists to explain militarization of refugee populated areas.  Thus, the states and agencies
adversely affected do not have any systematic framework to guide the development of
policy for coping with military activity that involves or affects refugees. Critics of refugee
relief find that, in some cases, humanitarian assistance actually provides a military
advantage to one group of combatants.11  The Bosnian cases chosen for analysis in this
paper demonstrate that, under certain circumstances, the spread of political violence due
to refugee flows can be contained.  The following section of the paper provides a brief
review of the relevant theoretical literature.  The main body of the paper then analyses the
political relationships that preceded the breakaway of the Muslim enclave and elaborates
on the case of the Velika Kladusa refugees who formed an army, yet eventually were
demilitarized.  From the experience of those refugees, propositions on the causes of
political violence involving refugees are derived.  The paper concludes with remarks on
the challenges faced by humanitarian agencies.
REFUGEES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
Two bodies of literature contribute to propositions on the spread of political violence due to
refugee flows—international relations and refugee studies.  Until recently international
relations scholars tended to ignore the political and military implications of refugee
movements.  Current advances in the theory of civil war now highlight the implications of
civil and ethnic wars that spill across borders, although Michael Brown admits that “no
systemic study exists of the ways in which internal conflict engages and involves neighboring
states.”12 Although most scholars agree that the presence of refugees and diasporas affects the
security and foreign policy of sending and receiving states, international relations literature rarely
addresses the issue directly. 13
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Refugees and exiles can contribute to the internationalization of civil war in many ways, yet
theories that treat refugees as an independent variable often do not specify the mechanisms
by which refugee movements lead to the spread of conflict.  Brown limits his analysis to
comments on “waves of refugees and motley gangs of renegade troops” that “crash across
borders.”14  Ben Barber offers a more precise analysis in his scathing attacks on
humanitarian aid to refugees as a cause of war.  He argues that “the packed camps,
protected by international sympathy and international law, provide excellent cover for
guerrillas and serve as bases from which they can launch attacks.”15  Building on the civil
war literature, this paper attempts to operationalize refugee populations as an independent
variable.
The refugee studies literature does not offer systematic study of the security implications
of refugee populations either, although there is growing attention to the issues of security
threats and military activity.16  Myron Weiner contends that refugee flows can be
understood “both as cause and consequence of international conflict.”17 Similarly, Gil
Loescher finds that “the activities and ambitions of the refugees themselves, as well as
those of the governments of asylum and of the guerrilla movements in both sending and
receiving states, are additional significant factors in the prolongation and complexity of
refugee problems.”18  Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo offer a brief, but seminal, contribution
to the list of challenges posed by refugee participation in war. Their analysis recognizes
the dangers created by militarized refugees, even when the violence does not occur in the
refugee camps.19
THE VELIKA KLADUSA REFUGEES
A particularly interesting, yet relatively unexamined, instance of political violence concerns
the refugees created as a result of the actions of a breakaway Muslim faction led by the
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charismatic businessman Fikret Abdic during the war in former Yugoslavia. Under the
leadership of Abdic, a group of about 25,000 refugees fled their town—Velika Kladusa in
the Bihac pocket—twice during the war in Bosnia. (See timeline, Appendix 1) The first
exodus occurred in late 1994 when the Bosnian government army defeated Abdic’s forces.
That exile ended in early 1995 when the refugees formed an army to retake their
hometown from the Bosnian 5th Corps, which was deployed by the Muslim-led
government.  When the Bosnian Army pushed Abdic’s supporters out of Bosnia a second
time in August 1995, the exiles were unable to mobilize militarily.  The refugees either
returned peacefully or resettled to third countries. What accounts for the different
outcomes in each case?
The story of Fikret Abdic and his unsuccessful rebellion against the Sarajevo government
is often considered an outlier in the overall history of the war in former Yugoslavia.20
Regarding the Abdic refugee situation, UNHCR officials recognized that    “the problem
may be small relative to the overall numbers of displaced and refugees but it is highly
complex and no less politically charged.”21  Although the intra-Muslim conflict defies
conventional wisdom about ethnic conflict and ethnic affinity, it provides a uniquely
helpful case for the study of political violence among refugee populations.  By examining
the same population twice within a single conflict, the researcher controls for multiple
variations that would impede comparison of refugees across conflicts.  Later refinement of
the propositions developed in this paper will probe differences between paired populations
from the same conflict, for example Rwandan Hutu refugees in Zaire versus those in
Tanzania.
Refugees and the War in the Former Yugoslavia22
The break up of the Soviet empire, and resulting insecurity, contributed to political
upheaval and ethnic tension in Yugoslavia after 1989.23  In 91, Slovenia and Croatia
seceded from Yugoslavia, claiming fears of Serb domination of the federation.  The
secession, and perceived mistreatment of the Serb minority in Croatia, led to war between
Serbia and Croatia.  In the multi-ethnic state of Bosnia, wedged between Serbia and
Croatia, the majority Muslims felt threatened by the Serb-dominated Yugoslav federation.
Against the wishes of Bosnian Serbs, the state government decided to secede from
Yugoslavia in 1992.  Over the course of the ensuing war, Croatians and Muslims
alternately fought each other and allied against the Serb forces.  Within the Croat-Muslim-
Serb hostility, a small intra-Muslim conflict emerged in  northwest Bosnia.  This paper
examines the refugees created by that rebellion against the Sarajevo government.
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The war created millions of refugees and internally displaced persons.  At the height of the
displacement crisis, “fully half of Bosnia’s pre-war population was dead or uprooted.”24
Most refugees did not live in camps but were either privately housed or accommodated in
collective centers (schools, hotels, army barracks, etc.).25  Refugee populations were
composed primarily of women, children, and the elderly.  For refugee men, militarization
took the form of forced conscription and did not directly affect the provision of assistance
to other refugees.  For example, in late 1992 and 1993, Croatian officials forcibly
repatriated draft-age Bosnian males to fight in the Bosnian army as part of a friendship
agreement between the two states.26  Wh n the alliance between the Muslims and Croats
collapsed in 1993, Croatia forcibly repatriated Bosnian men to Bosnian Croat prison
camps rather than to the Bosnian Army.  In the summer of 1993, after strong protests by
UNHCR and the international community, the Croatian government stopped arresting and
repatriating Bosnian refugees.  The vast majority of refugees did not engage in political
violence or military activity while receiving humanitarian assistance.  An exception to that
pattern was the group of refugees from Velika Kladusa who formed an army while
benefiting from UNHCR support.
Background of the Muslim Rebellion
The town of Velika Kladusa, Fikret Abdic’s power base, nestles in the far northwest
corner of Bosnia, in the Bihac region.  After the Second World War, Bihac was one of the
poorest areas in Yugoslavia.27   Abdic transformed the region into a highly profitable
industrial center.  Through his company, Agrokomerc, he controlled virtually every aspect
of the economy. His empire included local television and radio stations (invaluable
resources for the later war against the Sarajevo government).28  By providing lucrative
employment and a high standard of living, Abdic secured the undying loyalty of most of
the inhabitants of Bihac, especially those in Velika Kladusa.29
In what had seemed a permanent defeat, Abdic spent two years in prison under
investigation for commercial crime until his release in 1989.30  The temporary setback
slowed his rise to power, but not his popularity. A resilient politician and businessman,
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Abdic bounced back from prison and bankruptcy to become one of the ten members of the
Bosnian presidency in 1991.  While he actually won more votes than any candidate in
Bosnia in the 1991 regional elections,31 a still-unexplained intra-party deal gave the
presidency to Alija Izetbegovic.32
Observers agree that the residents of Velika Kladusa treated Abdic “like a god” and “were
ready to do whatever he said.” 33  One vivid image captures the reverence his followers
held for him.  After his release from prison in 1989, Abdic desired a triumphal entry into
Velika Kladusa.  For his return from incarceration supporters lined the main road, chanting
“Babo, Babo,” or “Daddy, Daddy.”   As his white Mercedes car entered town, supporters
slaughtered an ox in the road.  Perhaps prophetically, Abdic’s convoy arrived home
splashed in ceremonial blood.34
In order to understand the dynamics of the later violence, it is necessary to trace the
political and military relationships built by Abdic even before the war.  When war broke
out between Serbia and Croatia in 1991, Abdic’s political and economic fortunes were
governed by the complex political connections he had forged with the belligerents.
The Abdic empire, built around Agrokomerc, depended on a dangerous
and delicate web of trade links, involving Croatia (which gave Mr. Abdic a
free port in Rijeka), its Serbian enemies in Knin, the Bosnian Serb army
besieging fellow Muslims in the Bihac pocket, and Belgrade.35
That history of dealmaking stood him in good stead during the siege of Bihac in 1993.
Although other parts of the enclave starved, residents of Velika Kladusa survived on
smuggled and black market food.36  As usual, “Babo” took care of his people.
By spring 1992, the 6,000 square miles of the Bihac pocket were surrounded on four sides
by hostile forces—the breakaway Republic of Serb Krajina (carved out of Croatian
territory) to the west and north, and Bosnian Serbs to the south and east.37 (See Map,
Appendix 2.) The locally-situated 5th Corps of the Bosnian army was poorly armed and
unable to defend Bihac in case of attack.  A French battalion arrived as part of the UN
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in February 1993 but its mandate was limited.38
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Two reasons explain the continued Muslim control of Bihac, despite its vulnerable
position.  The large size of the enclave deterred the Serbs from attack, for fear of heavy
losses.  Secondly, “too many people were making too much money out of it to want it
snuffed out.”39  Despite a Serb blockade, the Bosnian 5th Corps successfully fought its way
out of the Bihac pocket for a brief period in 1994.  The secret of the Bosnian Army’s
strength was that “the Bosnian Serbs themselves…had sold the 5th Corps a good part of its
weaponry.” The Krajina Serbs even sent food into Abdic’s territory for processing by
Agrokomerc. 40
Abdic loyalists managed to profit from both UNHCR and the UNPROFOR battalion.
When UNHCR ran short of vehicles it hired eleven trucks and local drivers from Abdic. In
February 1993, that scheme ended in embarrassment when Serbs stopped the trucks at a
checkpoint and found about 700,000 Deutsche marks hidden in the door of the trucks.41
Some UNHCR officials suspected, but never confirmed, that Abdic used the humanitarian
convoys to import contraband for a huge profit.  Abdic also ran his own for-profit convoy
by importing food from Zagreb using French military trucks.  In an unorthodox bargain,
Abdic traded storage space in Agrokomerc warehouses in exchange for UNPROFOR
escorts of Abdic’s imports.42
The war between the Croatians and the Bosnian Muslims in 1993 greatly advanced
Abdic’s own position and may have spurred him to declare the Autonomous Province of
Western Bosnia in September of that year.43 A few months after the declaration of
autonomy, however, the Washington Framework Agreement of March 1994 enforced an
alliance on the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats (and their allies, the Croatian
government).44  At least officially, the breakaway Muslim enclave lost Croatia as a source
of support.
Some observers speculate that both Croatia and the Serbs tried to use Abdic to meet their
own, conflicting, goals.  “For the Serbs, Bihac was the missing link needed to join Serb-
held land in Croatia and Bosnia to Serbia itself, which is what Croatia wanted to avoid at
all costs.”45 Unconfirmed stories that Abdic provided intelligence about the Serb positions
to the Croatian government could explain Croatian tolerance for Abdic’s behavior and his
easy acquisition of Croatian citizenship.46 Tactically, the Croatian government needed
Bihac in “friendly” hands during the war.
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Several observers have asserted that Abdic made a fatal political error by declaring
autonomy in September 1993.  His declaration forced Sarajevo to consider him an enemy
and a traitor. Before the declaration, Abdic held a referendum and obtained over 50
percent of the vote in favor of autonomy.   He also met with the leader of the Bosnian
Army’s 5th Corps, Ramiz Drekovic, in an attempt to persuade the army to support
secession.  Drekovic requested time to consider the plan but Abdic rushed ahead and
proclaimed the existence of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia without the
consent of the  commander of the 5th Corps.   Only two brigades of the 5th Corps defected
with Abdic.47 The rest of the Bosnian army now targeted Abdic as a dangerous enemy. 
Prior to Abdic’s secession, the area of Bihac contained about 200,000 people.48  Roughly
50,000 lived in the northern part and were fiercely loyal to Abdic.  Further south, loyalty
to Sarajevo outweighed support of Abdic.49 Only the northern part followed Abdic in the
declaration of autonomy.  The declaration divided neighbors, and even families.  The
stated reason for secession stressed the radicalization and Islamic fundamentalism of
Sarajevo. Abdic claimed he just wanted to follow western capitalism free from ideological
restrictions. As one Abdic supporter categorically declared, “Alija Izetbegovic is the
biggest Muslim fundamentalist. Fikret Abdic is the best economist and smartest man.”50
Abdic declared that the enclave enjoyed a more natural linkage with Zagreb than with the
rest of Bosnia.  As an autonomous territory, he planned to continue dealing with both
Croats and Serbs.  Abdic followers claimed they enjoyed better food and drink in his army.
In addition to practical and self-interested reasons for supporting Abdic, “people had
enormous trust in him.”51
Abdic’s defection left the remainder of Bihac in dire straits.  The 5th Corps fought on four
fronts, with no hope of reinforcements.  Starvation loomed because the agricultural
industries required imported raw materials in order to produce.  Until the 1993 declaration
of autonomy, some aid had arrived by convoy to the southern part of Bihac.  After August
1993, Abdic and the Serbs blocked all aid to the beleaguered south.  UNHCR sources
reported that “[t]he Bihac pocket, where until recently activities ran very smoothly, has
become another source of serious concern: local authorities in Velika Kladusa informed
UNHCR and UNPROFOR that convoys would not be allowed into the area before 4
December [1993].”52
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The Bosnian Army launched an offensive against Abdic on June 10, 1994.53  “Both sides
reportedly impressed civilians into their armed forces, and detained others whose
sympathies were suspect (many families have members on both sides of the conflict).”54
The southern part of Bihac was desperate to break the blockade.  The Croatian
government, pushed into an alliance with Bosnia, “regretfully sacrificed Mr. Abdic—and
his cash.”55  The 5th Corps overran Velika Kladusa after Abdic refused to recant his
declaration of autonomy.56
1994 Exodus—Forced Withdrawal to Minefields and Chicken Coops
By August 21st, 1994 over 25,000 people had fled Velika Kladusa in front of the
advancing Bosnian Army, creating a 30-mile long stream of people.57 They trav led by
cars, buses, and tractors, bringing along 100 horses and herds of cattle.  Individual
motives for flight varied, but most observers agree that political leaders orchestrated the
refugee movement.
[Abdic’s supporters] sought to pressure others to leave, and are pressuring
them not to return.  They exercise effective control over the camps.  There
are those who fled fearing for their lives as the [Bosnian] army advanced,
often reacting to false rumors spread by the first group, a propaganda
campaign that began well before the final advance.  Others, as witnessed by
UNHCR, did not want to flee but were pressured to do so.  And there
were those who had long intended to leave and saw this as an
opportunity.58
The refugees ended up in two locations, both in Serb-held Krajina. To the west, about
16,000 people stopped at Batnoga, a disused chicken farm owned by Abdic, only a few
kilometers from their home.  To the east, 7,000 refugees went to Staro Selo, an area of
open ground.  After three or four days, “just as assistance was becoming organized, these
refugees moved to Turanj at the instigation of the local authorities and Abdic followers,
who were encouraging the refugees to force an entry into Croatia proper, and preventing
some from returning home.”  Some 2,500 of the refugees traveled directly to Turanj,
bypassing Staro Selo.59
As the refugees moved north, the Croatian government stopped them at Turanj, a
destroyed, heavily mined area between the front lines of Croatia and Serb-held Krajina.60
(See map, Appendix 3.) Turanj was a depopulated strip of land a few kilometers wide that
had been demilitarized when UNPROFOR negotiated a pullback between Serb and
                                                 
53 Daly, “Is Life Really Worth Living…”
54 UNHCR Office of the Special Envoy, July 1994.
55 Daly, “Is Life Really Worth Living…”
56 Davor Huic, “Bosnian Troops Take Rebel Stronghold,” The Guardian, August 22, 1994.
57 “Bosnia Enclave Falls to Army Forces,” Star Tribune (Minneapolis), August 22, 1994.
58 UNHCR Office of the Special Envoy, September 1994.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
Croatian forces. The Serbs allowed the refugees into Turanj at their checkpoint.  On their
side, Croatian police blocked the border with armored personnel carriers and water
cannon, trapping the refugees in no man’s land and crushing Abdic’s hopes of reaching
Croatian territory.61
In addition to the political desire to gain international attention, pragmatic considerations
governed the direction of the refugees’ flight.  Serb-held Krajina was not the refugees’
first choice for an asylum area.  As former migrant workers in Croatia, the refugees knew
they would find better economic opportunities there.  Serb-held Krajina, on the other
hand, was practically without water or electricity, and suffered 90 percent unemployment.
Ultimately, the refugees’ goal was resettlement in Germany or another European state.62
Living conditions in both camps were awful.  At Batnoga, the chicken coops had no
electricity, little clean water, and insufficient shelter against the cold.  In Turanj, sixty
percent of the refugees lived in destroyed buildings, thirty percent lived in vehicles, and ten
percent slept in UNHCR tents.63  Although the effects of the oncoming winter posed
“major health, fire, and security hazards,” the refugee leaders discouraged a peaceful
return.64
UNHCR pressured both the Bosnian government and the leaders of Serb-held Krajina to
facilitate a return of the refugees.  Sarajevo agreed to offer an amnesty to the refugees and
a six-month respite from military service.  In vain, UNHCR appealed to the Serbs to
ensure that “the refugees receive objective information, have a free choice on return, are
not subject to manipulation, and do not engage in acts incompatible with their status.”65
The Krajina Serbs ostensibly protected the refugees, but also restricted their movement
and access to information. Serb and Abdic police guarded the camps in a joint effort to
control the inhabitants.66
Military cooperation between the Krajina Serbs and Abdic’s forces continued during the
exile.  The Serbs outgunned the Bosnian Muslims but faced a severe disadvantage in the
infantry because Serb forces stretched across an impossibly long front-line through Bosnia
and Croatia. The 5th Corps had about 14,000 soldiers in Bihac.67  Abdic’s ability to raise
an army complemented the needs of the Serb forces, which were more than willing to
provide artillery support.
One observer explained why the Croatians, former allies of Abdic, refused to support the
refugees.  At the time of the refugee exodus,  Croatia and Bosnia were trying to patch up
their split.  When Abdic was defeated in 1994, the United States and Germany pressured
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Croatia to remain loyal to Sarajevo.  Despite Croatian sympathy for Abdic, he was still a
relatively minor player in the war.  Politically, Croatia could not risk international support
and the alliance with Sarajevo for the sake of Abdic’s 25,000 refugees.68
Abdic tightly restricted the information that reached the refugees, much to the frustration
of international organizations.  The relationship between Abdic and the refugees ensured
that they trusted implicitly the information produced by his radio station.69  International
organizations could not develop such a high level of trust, and refugees suspected outside
information as biased. The UNHCR had difficulty communicating the Bosnian
government’s amnesty offer because “the climate of intimidation and the scope for the
leadership to manipulate and interpret to the refugees both information and events
required caution.”70
On October 1 1994, the Krajina Serbs agreed to allow distribution in the Turanj camp of a
UNHCR note explaining the amnesty offer.  The letter, dated September 30 1994,
reminded refugees of their duties under international law: “We also need you to
understand that refugees must not engage in any hostile acts against either the authorities
in their home country or those where they are refugees.”71  UN workers were unprepared
for the violent reaction to the note. “Distribution started peacefully with the refugees
reading the note, but then the situation rapidly degenerated, as some refugees violently
objected to the contents of the note, which they prevented others from reading.”72  Abdic
supporters objected to the note’s condemnation of the military preparations for return and
the UN’s suggestion that a peaceful return was possible.  Angry refugees flipped over cars
of the UN Civilian Police, and UNHCR workers had to hide in fear for their lives.73 T
leaflet incident demonstrated both the importance of information and the difficulty of
countering militant propaganda.
In other, less violent ways, Abdic managed to obscure the UN message.  When the UN set
up a food distribution center for humanitarian aid, the refugee leaders hung a huge
billboard of Abdic’s face over the food tables.74  The refugees were meant to assume that
Abdic, not the UN, took care of their needs.  With Serb support, Abdic broadcast to the
refugees from a radio station in nearby Vojnic.75  A UNHCR spokesman complained
helplessly of an “orchestrated campaign to prevent refugees getting independent analyses
of the situation in Kladusa.”76
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The refugees’ utter reliance on Abdic propaganda encouraged hard-line attitudes toward
return.  As one refugee explained, “We all would rather go home, but not without our
Babo.”77  Since Abdic was wanted for war crimes in Bosnia, a peaceful return with him
was not a feasible option.  UN negotiators, pressing Abdic and the Krajina Serbs for
return, reported that “all talks on the political level with leaders of the refugees have been
unsuccessful so far.”78  Negotiators sensed that Abdic and his allies were willing to hold
out for a long-term political solution, using humanitarian aid to support the refugees
indefinitely.79
Throughout their exile, refugee leaders refused a UN-planned repatriation; instead, they
organized for a military return to their hometown.  Refugees had few alternatives other
than to go along with Abdic’s plan.  “The likely level of political manipulation against [a
peaceful] return was so high that a free and informed choice on their future might be
impossible in these circumstances.”80  A few refugees managed to escape to live with
relatives in Croatia.  UNHCR resettled nine families who did not want to fight with Abdic.
In order to protect the refugees from retaliation, UNHCR had to sneak them out of the
camp.81  Abdic’s strategy was to keep the refugees concentrated.  He wanted to force
entry into Croatia and used international attention on the terrible conditions in Turanj to
embarrass Croatia.
Refugees’ options were also limited by a lack of opportunities for resettlement,
employment, or integration into the local society. Both UNHCR and the Croatian
government treated the camps at Batnoga and Turanj as temporary.  The refugee leaders
met with many European representatives and pleaded for resettlement abroad.  All the
Europeans stressed the hopelessness of gaining asylum in Europe.  Despite Abdic’s
alliance with the Serbs, there was no question of the Muslim refugees settling permanently
in the Serb-held territory.
“The situation for the Abdic refugees was much worse than for the average refugee in
Croatia.”82  In order to encourage return, the Croatian government would not allow the
UN to build any permanent structures in the camps.  The refugees complained and
demanded more assistance in addition to UN-supplied sheeting, food, clothing, and some
medicine. The harsh conditions, combined with the impossibility of crossing into Croatia
proper, encouraged thoughts of return. However, “a quiet return was not acceptable…and
people started to envisage a military solution.”83 
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During the time that the refugees prepared for a military return, it was difficult to
determine the extent of their access to weapons.   The militants obviously wanted to hide
any weapons from UN personnel.  Observers agree that “a sizeable portion of the Abdic
exiles…fled in uniform with arms.”84  The refugees entered the camp with some small
arms but stored heavy weapons, including six fifty-year-old Soviet built tanks (donated by
the Serbs), outside the camp in Serb-held territory.  “Serbian soldiers were seen standing
over a huge pile of assault rifles and other military detritus turned over by Abdic’s fleeing
troops.”85  The refugees were able to buy more weapons from the Serbs to facilitate the
return to Velika Kladusa.86  Observers commented that young men were recruited from
the camp but trained in Serb-held territory.  UNHCR was unable to disarm the refugees or
control their movements between the camp and Serb-held Krajina.87
The situation of Turanj camp, in particular, highlights the difference between militarized
refugees and militarized camps.  Some UNHCR observers claim that Turanj posed no
security problem because there were no arms in the camps. However, they admit, “the
Serb territory was the depot.”88  Militant exiles left mortars and artillery with the Serbs
and then crossed to Turanj to sleep and eat with their families.  From the point of view of
the beleaguered 5th Corps in Bihac, the location of the arms in the camp or on the borders
was a purely academic distinction.  The end result—an army of refugees and exiles—was
the same.
“As soon as the 5th Corps [now] led by General Atif Dudakovic thrust out southwards
from the pocket, the Krajina Serbs began arming Abdic’s men.”89  In the second week of
November 1994, Abdic “began mobilizing draft age men in the camps to participate in the
offensive.”  Despite UN protests, between 5,000 and 10,000 refugee men were
mobilized.90 Abdic and Serb police organized the army and drafted any who were
unwilling to serve. One observer estimates that 75% of those who fought did so willingly.
People “had a feeling they were fighting for something good.”  The idea of return was
especially potent because they had previously enjoyed one of the wealthiest lifestyles in
Bosnia. Forcibly conscripted refugees reported that they fought because they had no other
choice.  Escapees were caught and returned to the camp by the Serb police.91
UN personnel helplessly observed uniformed Serbs and Abdic leaders drafting people in
the camps. Serbs positioned their artillery very close to the Batnoga camp, near the Bihac
border. UNHCR offered protests but could not compel a halt to the militarization.92 When
wounded refugee men entered Turanj, UN personnel could not ascertain how or where
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they had been wounded.93  The only weapon in the UN arsenal was the withdrawal of
humanitarian aid.  Because that would have deprived dependent families of food, UNHCR
continued to provide assistance to the camp.
The Abdic/Serb offensive began in December 1994.94 The refugees attacked Bihac using
the camps as a base.  With Serb support, the refugee army “hit the 5th Corps from behind,
so forcing it to fight on two fronts.”95 The besieged enclave was weakened by the
continued blockade of aid convoys.96  B  early 1995, the refugee army, with the help of
Serb logistics, regained control of Velika Kladusa.  As Abdic soldiers retook the town,
“Croatian Serb artillery continued to fire towards the internal confrontation line separating
the Abdic soldiers from the 5th Corps troops.”97  With the invaluable Serb assistance,
Abdic reestablished the front line at its July 1994 position.  Over a period of five days,
Batnoga and Turanj camps emptied of refugees as they returned to Velika Kladusa in the
same buses that had carried them out.98
1995 Exodus—Demilitarization
In 1995, the Abdic followers found themselves fleeing Velika Kladusa for a second time.
This time, the Krajina Serbs were totally defeated, which changed the equation in favor of
the refugees returning home peacefully. “As soon as the Krajina Serbs were attacked by
the Croats, Abdic’s defenses collapsed.”99  The loss of their patron Serbs, combined with
Croatian reliance on American support (which mandated an alliance with Sarajevo) left the
Velika Kladusa refugees no opportunity to engage in political violence.  The political shifts
weakened Abdic’s influence in the region, although his people remained fiercely loyal.
Additionally, the refugees had more options than they did in 1994, decreasing their
enthusiasm for militancy. The same group of refugees faced changed external political
conditions, which helped determine their behavior.
Events leading up to the second exile, and final defeat, at first suggested that Abdic might
continue to reign in Bihac.  Upon regaining power in Velika Kladusa in early 1995, Abdic
and his Serb allies continued the Bihac blockade.  Disputes over aid convoys sparked
fighting between the 5th Corps and its enemies.  As the only entrance for the convoys
passed through Abdic-controlled territory, UNHCR depended completely on Abdic, even
though he “was demanding a larger allocation of aid going into the pocket than UNHCR
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considered justified.” In March, UNHCR took the drastic step of suspending aid to Velika
Kladusa and Serb-held UNPA100 North in light of their obstruction of aid.101
At the end of July 1995, Abdic and Krajina Serb troops launched an offensive on southern
Bihac and made significant gains.   The Croatian government, while sympathetic with
Abdic, did not want Bihac to fall to his Serb allies.  The Croatians and the Bosnians had
agreed in the “Split Declaration” of July 1995 to jointly repel Serb aggression.102    Once
again, Croatian sympathy for Abdic (and the desire to do business with him) was
overruled by larger political interests.103
 The Croatian Army began an offensive to retake Serb-held Krajina in the summer of
1995. (See map, Appendix 4.)  “Operation Storm” first attacked Serb forces in UNPA
North and South.104  The offensive lasted two or three days in the South and a bit longer
in the North.  When Krajina collapsed, the Croatians crossed into Bosnia but, unlike the
harsh offensive in UNPA North and South, Croatian forces were restrained in the Abdic
enclave. Although both the Bosnian and Croatian armies had reorganized and rearmed, the
Bosnian 5th Corps posed a greater threat to Abdic’s forces. Abdic quickly surrendered to
the Sarajevo government and his followers fled north out of their hometown.105
During their second flight, the Velika Kladusa refugees did not receive assistance from the
Krajina Serbs, who had been routed by the Croatian Army.  The refugees crossed the
border into Croatia just after the Serbs fled and before the Croatians established border
guards. Croatian Special Police stopped the 25,000 refugees on the road near the village
of Kuplensko, only 18 kilometers from the Bihac border.106  The Croatians established a
checkpoint and fenced in the area as thousands of people set up camp on a four-kilometer
stretch of roadside. The whole situation was very chaotic, as the territory had just been
liberated from the Serbs and 150,000 Serbs driven out of UNPA North and South.107
Initially, UNHCR could not even locate the refugees, although they knew that thousands
of people had left Velika Kladusa.  The UN had to obtain permission from the Croatian
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government to enter UNPA North.  UNHCR representatives found the refugees
surrounded by drunken Croatian soldiers who were attempting to push the refugees back
to Bihac.  After heated negotiations, Croatia allowed UN food trucks through to the
refugees.108
Despite the changed political circumstances, UNHCR still found it difficult to
communicate with the refugees due to the strength of Abdic’s propaganda.  The refugee
leaders accused the UN of bias when it tried to distribute accurate information.  The “hard
core” leaders, about 500 of them, controlled the camp and violently discouraged attempts
to return or speak to outsiders.  The refugees made decisions based on the incomplete and
biased information provided by Abdic and his supporters.109
Most observers agree that weapons did not pose a great problem in Kuplensko. Croatian
police did not completely disarm the refugees but effectively prevented the group from
entering any further into Croatia.  As in Turanj and Batnoga, UNHCR lacked any means
to disarm or control the refugees.  The only military support extended to UNHCR was the
United Nations Military Liaison Officer (UNMLO), which acted purely in an advisory
capacity.  The Officer could explain to the civilian UNHCR about the capability of certain
weapons or how, in theory, military maneuvers might be carried out.  Any disarmament
procedures relied on voluntary compliance and brought in few weapons.110
Refugees began to return home when the influence of their leaders weakened. Once he lost
Serb backing, Abdic’s leadership was not strong enough to mobilize an army to retake
Velika Kladusa.  Within Kuplensko, Abdic maintained the loyalty of the refugees but he
was unable to capitalize on that loyalty as he had done in 1994.  Without the assistance of
the Krajina Serbs, who had armed the refugees and policed the camps, Abdic’s leaders
could not compel unswerving obedience from the refugees for any extended period of
time. Some of Abdic’s leaders left the camps because they had connections in Croatia or
Germany.  Others were recruited into “key positions” in the Croatian army.  People
became discouraged and desired return.  The presence of the Croatian police finally put an
end to intimidation against return by Abdic supporters.111
The majority of the refugees stayed in Kuplensko from August to December 1995.  As
winter approached, UNHCR focused on repatriating people from the ill-equipped camp.
Refugee militants stopped the first group of returnees by surrounding the bus and
threatening to blow it up. Croatian police accompanied later buses with a five car convoy
to deter intimidation.112
By June 1996, about 10-15,000 refugees had repatriated peacefully to Velika Kladusa.
Women, children, and the elderly usually returned first.  Once they reported that the
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situation was safe, former soldiers returned to their families.  Few violent incidents were
reported, although the returnees did face some harassment by political opponents and local
police.113   Five thousand hard core followers of Abdic remained at Kuplensko, refusing to
return.  Those refugees saw “the camp, which was very close to the border with
[Bosnia]—as an effective base for recruiting DNZ (Abdic) party support.”114 A  one
UNHCR official recalled, “they were a difficult bunch of people.”115
In order to break the political organization of the refugees who were living perilously near
the Bosnian border, Croatia relocated the remaining refugees.  The refugee leaders,
showing their clout, refused to relocate unless ensured of the refugees’ right to vote in the
1996 Bosnian elections.116  Once the United Nations negotiated voting rights, many
refugees went to Gasinci camp in eastern Croatia.  They lived in a former army barrack
while awaiting resettlement to third countries.  About 1,200 of the refugees were
transferred to Obonjan collective center on a rocky, desolate island.117  Both locations
allowed the government to limit the refugees’ movements and contacts with possible
militants in Velika Kladusa.
Rather than forming an army, the 5,000 hard-line refugees resettled to third countries.
The militants were denied that option in 1994 at Turanj and Batnoga camps. By
facilitating return of the compliant refugees, Croatia was able to separate out the trouble-
makers and remove them from the border of their homeland.  Increasing international
acceptance of resettling Bosnian refugees offered a non-violent option to refugees who
refused to return home peacefully.118
FINDINGS
What aspects of the Velika Kladusa refugee situation led to the spread of political violence
across borders?   The comparison of the first and second exoduses reveal many similarities
between the two experiences.  Focusing on the same group of refugees over time allows
the researcher to disregard temporarily many plausible hypotheses about the causes of
militarization.  Two of the most common propositions include the beliefs that a mixed
(civilian and non-civilian) population of refugees causes violence, and that manipulative,
ambitious leaders can convince refugees to engage in violence (or hold the refugees
hostage).  According to the first hypothesis, when militant exiles mix with the refugees,
the sending and receiving states may view the entire refugee population as a potential
security threat.  A mixed population also raises the likelihood of both voluntary and forced
conscription of refugees.  According to the second hypothesis, manipulation by leaders
                                                 
113 UNHCR Office of the Special Envoy, November 1995, January 1996.
114 UNHCR Office of the Special Envoy, June/July 1996.
115 UNHCR official, interview by author, Geneva, July 1998.
116 Quang Bui, interview by author, Geneva, July 1998.
117 Goran Andjelic, interview by author, Split, Croatia, June 1998.
118 The United States eventually accepted about 1,000 of the Velika Kladusa refugees.
can include propaganda or coercion that mobilizes refugees to engage in military activity,
convincing them that a peaceful return home is not possible.
At first glance, both those hypotheses offer plausible explanations of the refugees’
militancy following their first flight from Velika Kladusa.  In both the first and second
refugee experiences, the population included non-civilian elements. Most of the male
refugees had experience as soldiers, and some even fled in uniform.119  The refugees also
followed a manipulative and ambitious leader, Fikret Abdic, throughout their ordeals.  The
refugee leaders controlled the refugees’ access to information and ability to leave the
camp.  However, because these similarities existed across the two instances of refugee
flows studied here, one cannot claim that either the effects of a mixed population or
manipulative leaders were solely responsible for militancy in the Velika Kladusa case.   It
is possible that a non-civilian population and ambitious, powerful leaders are necessary
conditions for militarization, but clearly they are not sufficient, since they existed
throughout both refugee situations, when the refugees were militarized and when they
were not.
 The most striking difference in the two refugee situations is the external political
environment, particularly the attitude of the receiving state toward the refugees. The
Velika Kladusa case highlights the importance of external political conditions that interact
with the presence of a mixed population and manipulative leaders. The refugees’ political
goals did not change between their first and second exiles.  The means to carry out those
goals changed dramatically, however. In the first departure from Velika Kladusa, Fikret
Abdic held complete control over his followers and, by virtue of past financial deals, had
some clout with the Krajina Serbs. The combination of Serb artillery and Abdic’s soldiers
gave the Serbs a temporary advantage over the Bosnian 5th Corps.  The receiving “state,”
the Republic of Serb Krajina, was hostile to the sending state and had the means to arm
the refugees for a challenge.  In contrast, the 1995 surrender to the Bosnian 5th Corps and
the Croatian rout of the Serbs left Abdic with no strong external supporter. Although
defeat did not dull the intense loyalty of the refugees to Abdic, the Croatian Special Police
limited the extent of possible manipulation and mobilization.
The attitude and relative military capability of the receiving state significantly determined
the level of militarization.  In the first exile, Krajina Serbs exercised strict control over the
camps.  Unlike the Croatian government, however, the Serbs used their power to
encourage political violence and shield the refugees from international interference.
Croatia, the receiving state in the second exodus, possessed both the ability and the
willingness to secure the camps.  Croatian Special Police guarded the camp and restricted
the movements of the refugees, not hesitating to shoot at escapees.  Although there were
combatants living among the refugees, they were too afraid of the Croatians to organize
themselves.  Former soldiers removed their uniforms and tried to blend in with the other
refugees.120 The police also forcefully repatriated some of the men to Bihac. UNHCR
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efforts to winterize the Kuplensko camp were hampered by the “extremely strict control
imposed by the Croatian Special Police.”121  Political willingness and capability of the
receiving state to discourage militarization differentiated the two camp experiences.
The experience of the Velika Kladusa refugees suggests the importance of a relatively
powerful receiving state that is hostile to the sending state.  Such a state may be willing to
arm refugees or at least turn a blind eye to political violence. Since military activity by
refugees contravenes international law and risks alienating humanitarian donors,
militarization often requires a patron powerful enough to shield the refugee population
from the disapproval of the international community.122  In the Velika Kladusa case, the
presence of non-civilians and manipulative refugee leaders led to cross-border violence
only when combined with a sympathetic and powerful receiving state.
An additional difference between the first and second refugee experience is the alternatives
available to the refugees.  Three factors limited the options of the refugees in the first
exodus.  Their own leaders refused to countenance a peaceful return, the international
community declined to resettle them elsewhere, and their host state was an impoverished,
war-torn renegade territory that offered few long-term benefits for residents.  From
Kuplensko, dismal as it was, the refugees’ choices were not as circumscribed.  The
different options available in the first and second refugee experience suggest that more
attention should be paid to the alternatives open to refugees.
IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN ACTION
The experience of humanitarian organizations in the Turanj and Batnoga camps highlights
the challenges inherent in providing both security and assistance to refugees.  Three paths
of action are available to NGOs and UNHCR when confronted with potentially militarized
refugees, such as the Velika Kladusa group.  Humanitarian agencies can attempt to
prevent, reduce, or ignore militarization of refugee populations. Within each category of
policy—prevention, reduction, and passivity—there are a variety of options. Two
important conditions that determine the humanitarian response are the level of available
resources and the attitude of the receiving state.
With adequate resources and the cooperation of the receiving state, militarization could be
prevented at the outset of a refugee movement.  By screening the exiles as they cross the
border, UNHCR (in tandem with a security force) could separate refugees from soldiers or
other non-refugee exiles.  Camps or settlements would be established to ensure separation
between militant exiles and the refugee population.  Screening and separating the exile
population would reduce the risk of attacks on refugees by the sending state and limit the
                                                 
121 UNHCR Office of the Special Envoy, September 1995, October 1995, and November 1995.
122 For example, the Organization of African Unity prohibits any refugee from “subversive activities”
against any member state of the OAU. It specifically outlaws “any activity likely to cause tension between
Member States, and in particular by use of arms, through the press, or by radio.” OAU, Convention
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Article 3, 1969.
refugees’ exposure to manipulation and conscription.123
Efforts to prevent militarization are frequently hampered by lack of cooperation by the
receiving state and the inadequacy of security forces, however.  In the past, neither the
receiving state nor the international community (for instance, the Security Council) has
been eager to implement a forceful screening process.  Prevention obviously works best
when separation of a mixed civilian and military exile population requires a minimum of
force.  Successful prevention also requires adequate warning of refugee movements, in
order to prepare screening processes and secure camps.  Prevention is less likely when
humanitarian agencies are surprised and overwhelmed by refugee flows.124
Once refugees have become militarized, policy prescriptions include reduction and
management of violent activity.  Possible responses by humanitarian agencies range from
information campaigns to hiring private security to withdrawal of assistance. As in
prevention, the variables of adequate resources and receiving state cooperation can hinder
attempts to reduce or manage militarization. NGOs and UNHCR often cannot summon
the necessary resources to ensure security for refugees. In a recent policy paper, UNHCR
affirmed that “the problem of security in refugee-populated areas should...be regarded as
an issue for which a multiplicity of actors share responsibility.”125  Many of the protection
policies create dilemmas for UNHCR and NGOs as they attempt to balance security and
humanitarian assistance. Critics of the current system of humanitarian assistance, such as
the human rights organization Africa Rights, suggest that UNHCR and NGOs should
condition aid on security guarantees, in order to prevent its misuse.
The experience of Rwandan refugees in Zaire from 1994 to 1996 generated much of the
current debate about humanitarian assistance.  During that crisis, UNHCR attempted to
counteract militarization among the refugee population by hiring members of the Zairian
armed forces as police.  The experiment proved a mixed success and was resorted to only
as a desperate measure when the Security Council refused to help demilitarize the refugee
population.126  Africa Rights condemned the assistance program because it clearly aided
Rwandan exiles who had participated in the genocide and then evacuated the Hutu
population in order to destabilize the new Tutsi government. Africa Rights suggested that
UNHCR should have resolved conflicting claims between justice and humanitarianism in
Rwanda by “linking the provision of assistance to the refugees with the extradition of
                                                 
123 For suggestions on security measures, see Karen Jacobsen, “A ‘Safety-First’ Approach to Physical
Protection in Refugee Camps,” Ro emarie Rogers Working Paper Series (Cambridge, MA: Center for
International Studies, MIT), May 1999, and Jeremy Ginifer, “Protecting Displaced Persons through
Disarmament,” Survival 40, No. 2 (Summer 1998), 161-176.
124 For example, on 28 April 1994, over 200,000 Rwandans crossed into Tanzania in 24 hours.  Ray
Wilkinson, “The Heart of Darkness,” Refugees 110 (Winter 1997), 5.
125 Quang Bui, Ensuring the Civilian and Neutral Character of Refugee-Populated Areas: A Ladder of
Options (Geneva: Center for Documentation and Research, UNHCR, July 1998).
126 For an in-depth assessment of the Zaire situation, see Joel Boutroue, “Missed Opportunities: The Role
of the International Community in the Return of the Rwandan Refugees from Eastern Zaire,” Rosema ie
Rogers Working Paper Series (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Studies, MIT, 1998).
leading extremists to face trial for crimes against humanity and the disarming and
demobilization of the remnants of the Rwandan Armed Forces.”127
Along similar lines, Ben Barber argues that by ignoring militarization, NGOs and UNHCR
unwittingly affect the military balance between combatants.  He recommends that
“demilitarization of camps should be a requirement for humanitarian aid.”128  If militants
would rather sacrifice the refugees than disarm, the alternative is forceful demilitarization
by an external security force. The options for procuring security forces include United
Nations troops, unilateral interventions,129 local police, and private (mercenary) guards.  In
addition to political will, effective security requires training, equipment, and funding.  In
the absence of adequate security, UNHCR and NGOs face the difficult choice of providing
humanitarian assistance (which may enable militarization) or withdrawing aid from a
vulnerable population.130
Recognizing the political and military difficulties involved in coercive demilitarization,
Barber suggests alternate measures including camp isolation and targeted assistance (for
instance, only to women and children).  Many refugee experts suggest locating camps
away from the border in order to reduce security tensions.  Critics, especially in the
receiving state, counter that moving refugees away from the border will hinder return.
Self-settlement of refugees, as opposed to gathering people in camps, may reduce the
likelihood of militarization.  However, the need for camps will not disappear, especially
when large or sudden flows of people require assistance.
For a variety of reasons, humanitarian agencies may choose to sidestep, or ignore, the
issue of militarization.  Philosophically, many NGOs oppose the presence of armed guards
or security details for humanitarian missions.131  NGO  and UNHCR may not perceive the
military activity as a problem if the refugees store arms and train outside the camp
boundaries.  In some cases, the military activity may have the active support of a
superpower or influential donor.  During the 1980s, humanitarian agencies ignored
militarization in southern Africa in the face of widespread support for the political aims of
the African National Congress (ANC) and the South-West African People’s Organization
(SWAPO).
Practical and ethical reasons may influence UNHCR to ignore signs of militarization.
Legally, the refugee receiving state, not the humanitarian agencies, must provide security.
Without support from the receiving state, unarmed humanitarian organizations have little
control over military activity.  Militarization that is condoned by the refugee receiving
state or a powerful donor state further limits the options of UNHCR and NGOs.  Finally,
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1100.
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129 Such as the French “Operation Turquoise” in Rwanda.
130 For a discussion of the dilemmas of humanitarian aid, see Mary B. Anderson, Do No Ha m: How Aid
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UNHCR policy-makers are likely to feel ambivalent about encouraging (or forcing)
refugees to return, even if that seems the only solution to militarization.132
The Croatian response to the Velika Kladusa refugees in 1995 demonstrates that
participation in political violence is not a foregone conclusion, even among previously
militarized groups.  Strong security measures by the receiving state, in this case backed up
by pressure from the United States, limited the threat posed by the hard-line refugee
leaders.  The loss of external support convinced most refugees to demilitarize and accept a
peaceful return or resettlement to a third country.  Despite their weaknesses, international
organizations can play vital supporting roles in demilitarization by developing information
programs to counter propaganda and pressing for early planning to thwart militarization of
refugees.  In the absence of restraint by receiving states or external security guarantees,
however, international humanitarian organizations must operate within the constraints of
regional political forces, if they choose to operate at all.
                                                 
132 On forced repatriation, see Anne Bayefsky and Michael W. Doyle, Emergency Return, Principles and
Guidelines (Princeton: Center for International Studies, Princeton University, 1999).
Appendix 1
TIMELINE OF EVENTS IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
1989 Collapse of the Soviet Union
June 1991 Slovenia and Croatia declare independence from Yugoslavia
July1991 War between Serbia and Croatia begins
March 1992Bosnia declares independence from Yugoslavia
April 1992 War in Bosnia begins
March 1993Muslim/Croat conflict
Sept 1993 Abdic declares Autonomy from Sarajevo
Mar 1994 Muslim and Croat alliance—Washington Framework Agreement
Aug 1994 Bosnian Army expels Abdic and followers to Batnoga and Turanj
Dec 1994 Refugee army retakes Velika Kladusa with Serb assistance
July 1995 Formal Croat and Muslim alliance; Srebrenica massacre
Aug 1995 Krajina Serbs defeated and the Abdic group expelled to Kuplensko
Nov 1995  Dayton Peace Agreement
1996 Most Abdic refugees return home peacefully
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